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v.

SEcURITY-FIRST NAT. BANK
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[46 C.2d 697; 299 P.2d 657]

powers or
consider ''the eircnmof the parties" and then held in accon1anee ·with the
record that no
of any kind had been shown for
snit money to the wife.
Eneh order is affirmed.
C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Carter, .J.,
.L. concurred.

.J., and Spence,

petition of appl'llani in L . .A. 23409 for a rehearing
dl'nil'd Jnl~1956.

rL. A. No. 23569.

In Bank.

.June 28, 1956.]

,\LUtN I1EE \YOODR, Appellant, ,._ SECTTin'l'Y-FTHST
NA'l'IONATJ BANK OF LOS ANGEI1ES (a Corporation), as Exe,·ntor. <"te ., rt al.,
[1

Husband and Wife- Changing Character of Property by
Agreement.-Separate property of husband or wife may lw
eonvrrted into community property or dec t•cr.'a at any tinw
oral agreement hetwePn tlw spousP~. (Per
.T.,
Gibson, C. .J., and Shenk, .J.)
!d.-Marriage Settlements - Antenuptial Agreements.-- An
oral antenuptial agreement is pffective if it is exPcuted su hse-

Ser~ Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, ~ 58.
McK. Dig, References: [1, 3-G] Husband and Wife, § 159; [2]
Husband and Wife, § 19; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 991.
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[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

·wooDs v. SEcuRITY-FIRsT NAT. BANK

[46 C.2d

acts and conduct in
confirmation of it.
Carter, J.,
C.
and
J.)
!d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-A showthat there was an oral agreement before
that
the wife's property was to be
property and that
after the marriage it was
that her property "had bedeclared to her huscome"
band and to
become
to which
made out a clear
an executed agreement which transmuted the propJ., Gibson, C.
and Shenk,
!d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-Mutual
consent of the spouses is consideration for an agreement to
transmute the wife's separate property to community property.
(Per Carter, J., Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J.)
!d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-An oral
agreement between spouses for transmutation of the wife's
separate property to community property is fully performed
when the agreement is made, since it immediately transmutes
and converts such separate propert5T to community property
and nothing further remains to be done. (Per Carter, J., Gibsm~,
C. J., and Shenk, J.)
!d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-In an
action by a surviving husband to obtain property which stood
in his deceased wife's name at the time of her death, where
it was not clear from the findings whether an agreement for
transmutation of the wife's separate property to community
property created a community property life estate in the
property with a present vested remainder interest in the whole
in him or whether the spouses were to hold the property as
community in fee simple and decedent would either not will
away her half of it or would will it to him, a judgment that
the surviving husband had no interest in the property could
not be affirmed on the theory that the findings must be construed to support the judgment. (Per Carter, J., Gibson, C. J.,
and Shenk, J.)
Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of
Decree.-\Vhere a surviving husband filed a petition to determine heirship in the estate of his deceased wife and the court
determined that he was entitled to one half of the property,
such decision is res judicata in a subsequent action by him
to obtain propPrty which stood in decedent's name at the time
of her death; it is immaterial whether the probate court
found the property to he community or RPpa t':ltP, it havingihP powPt' to <leterminc tlrP que;;tion of hPirship ]li'I'SPllt<'d hy
:r pPtition properly innlking the jurisdidion of the eourt
under Proh. Code, § 1080, and the fact that the petition also
sought to have the entire estate declared to be community
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Court o:f Los
Reversed with
uw>uauu to obtain
which
name at time of her death. Judg"'-''·L"""'"'u""' reversed with directions.

and John J.
and Rex W. Kramer for Respondents.
Cki\RTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in an
in which he sought to obtain property which stood in
deceased wife's, Eugenic's, name at the time of her death.
From the findings of the court it appears that defendant
is the executor of Eugenie's will, she having died on
28, 1949, at the age of 91. Plaintiff and decedent were
on January 14, 1949. (The other defendants are
under the will.) At the time of the marriage
"'""'"'""""'" owned considerable real and personal property and
agreed with him [plaintiff] that if they were
ma.:rri.ea, all of her property would become community propand would become his property at her death.
the marriage of plaintiff and said decedent, she
declared to plaintiff and to others that by reason of
marriage the property had become the community propof herself and plaintiff and would become his
her
to which statement plaintiff assented; and said decedent
.rnren<1ea by such declarations to transmute her separate propto community property. At the time of the marriage of
plaJlllLlll and
decedent, and thereafter, plaintiff was posof no property, except items of personal use and adorn. .. . After the said. marriage plaintiff earned no money
contributed nothing in the way of property, money, or
to the community. After the marriage, said dedid nothing in tile way of the transmutation of her
property, except to make tile oral declarations herestated; she did not part with tile control of any of
property or put the possession of any of it in plaintiff;

plaincontinued to live as her
made after her
as well
may have made
any action on the part of her
transfer
control or
''
conclusions of law the court declared that plaintiff had
interest in any of decedent's property
a homestead
set aside in the probate proceedings for a
of five years;
that all the property was her separate property and she had
not
any of it to plaintiff; that the "oral agreements
and declarations between the parties hereinbefore found were
not executed or consummated'' and such agreements and declarations were barred by section 1624, subdivisions 3 and 6 of
the Civil Code, 1 and section 1973, subdivisions 3 and 6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 2 and section 1091 of the Civil Code. 3
,Judgment for defendants followed accordingly.
Decedent left a will executed before her marriage to plaintiff in which she left some property to plaintiff, her servant;
that bequest was cancelled by a later codicil. Whether she
successfully disinherited plaintiff, her after acquired spouse
Prob. Code, § 70; Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280
P .2d 908] ) , is not before us.
Plaintiff contends that the judgment is not supported by
the findings above quoted because thereunder there was an
executed oral agreement transmuting decedent's separate
property to community property; that an order of the court
1
' ' The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged or by his agent: . . .
'' :;. An agreement made upon consideration of marriage other than
a mutual promise to marry; . . .
''G. . . . an agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or to make
nny provision for any persons by will . . . . " (Civ. Code, § 1624, subds.
3, 6.)
2
The Code of Civil Procedure provision corresponds with section 1624,
snbd. 3, and subd. G of the Civil Code, snpra.
'"'An estate in real property, other than an estate at will or for a
term not exeeeding one year, can be transferred only by operation of
law, or by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing
of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing." (Civ.
Code, § 1091.)
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it
is effective if it is executed
as disclosed
acts and conduct in confirmation of
v. J[cnney, 220 Cal. 134 [30 P.2d
; Handley
113 Cal.App.2d 280 [248 P.2d 59] ; Estate of
81 Cal.App.2d 348 [183 P.2d 919] .)
Defendants contend, however, that there was no agreement
the property was to be community; that if there was
an agreement neither it nor the prenuptial agreement
consummated, pointing out that it has been held that
is not such an execution of an oral marriage settlecontract as will take it out of the statute of frauds.
Hughes v. Hughes, 49 Cal.App. 206 [J93 P. 144]; 13
811-812.)
clearly show
The findings of the court above
agreement before marriage that decedent's property
be community property. After the marriage it was
that her property "had become" community property.
This follows from the finding that decedent declared to
and others that the property had become community
to which declaration plaintiff asseutecl; that by such
to which plaintiff
decedent intruded to
her separate property to
property.
a
case of an executed
which transmuted the property. The court >vent on to find that no action
taken by deeedent or plaintiff to transfer title, eontrol
and the property continued to be treated as
thus indieating it thought the law to be that some
in addition to the
was necessary before the
agreement was executed, but as later discussed that was not
necessary.
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An
such as we have here has as ~w"'""''cn:a~,
if any is needed, the mutual consent of the spouses.
(See
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal.2d 788
f108 P.2d 405], and cases there cited; see Title Ins. &; Trust
Co.
153 CaL 1 [94 P. 94] .) [5] In Estate of
Raphael, 91
931, 939 [206 P.2d
, it is said.:
''The
of the oral agreement of transmutation was
fully
when the agreement was made for it
transmuted and converted the separate
of
each spouse into community property, and nothing further
remained to be done.'' In that case, other than
of the oral agreement that separate property of one spouse
was to be community property, nothing was shown except
the making of income tax returns treating the property a~
community. No transfers or instruments of conveyance were
executed and no delivery of possession of property made. The
tax returns were not essentially different in effect than decedent's declaration in the instant case that the property was
community. In most of the other cases dealing with oral
transmutation agreements there was evidence of various things
such as the use of the property by the spouses as though it
were of the character to which it was transmuted by agreement, commingling of property and similar factors, but the
language stating the rule in the cases is broad. Those other
ihings are only evidence which may sustain or refute the
existence of an agreement for transmutation or its execution;
none of the cases hold that they are indispensable. Recognizing the practice of informality in property dealings between
husband and wife it appears there was nothing more to be
done in this case. The transmutation had taken place; it
was a fait ae;cornpli. It is not surprising under the facts
in the instant case that nothing more was done since the
parties were married only about four months before decedent's
death. If other things are indispensable as argued by defendants, then in cases of the death of a spouse shortly
after the agreement, the rule would generally not apply
because of the physical improbability of the time to do those
things. We know of no such limitation on the rule.
[6] Plaintiff claims more than one-half of the community
property notwithstanding d<>crdcnt 's lw.lf was given to others
by tlw will. He asserts that the agrr·rnwnt l1etween aecedent
and him creatl'cl a community property life estate in the
property with a present vested remainder interest in the
whole in him; the vested remainder portion of the agreement

0
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wonld be created at the same time
it is not clear from the court
heretofore
w hethr'r a
and ye"ted remainder were created or
decedent were to hold the property as
in fee
and decedent would either not will
her half of it or would will it to plaintiff. If it is the
fJ""''uvcuL is confronted with subdivision 6 of Civil Code
1624, quoted S1lpra, and that portion of the agreement
not executed because decedent did leave a will and did
not leave the property to plaintiff. If the findings are subject
latter construction, the judgment cannot be affirmed on
that the findings must be construed to support the
because the court found that plaintiff obtained no
in the property by the agreement and it is not found
that portion of the agreement making the property
is separable from the portion agreeing to not
to anyone else except plaintiff.
foregoing furnishes sufficient ground for reversal, but
there is an additional reason why a reversal should be ordered
because of the defendant's plea of res judicata.
'l'he record shows that on lVIay 17th the plaintiff filed
in
matter of the estate of his deceased wife a petition
to determine heirship in which he alleged that the decedent
left will executed on April18, 1945 (which provided therein
for the plaintiff) ; that she made a codicil thereto dated
20, 1945 (by which the decedent excluded the plaintiff
the will as a beneficiary) ; that the plaintiff and the
deeedent were married on .January 15, 1949; that by reason
marriage the decedent died intestate as to the plaintiff
Prob. Code, § 70; Estate
Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280
789]), and that he was the heir of the decedent as her
""~~-'--'-spouse
Prob. Code, §§ 221, 223, 224). The
to determine heirship prayed that the court declare
of the parties and ''determine to whom distribution
of said estate should be made."
his petition the plaintiff as an heir of the decedent
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in probate
HlHli'r section 1080 of the Probate Code. 'l'he court determined

the present action.
in
at its conclusion
to one-half is
to decide
that

before the commencement of
the court
was entitled
had the

Bank v .
It mattered not whether
found the
to be com.
It had the power to decide the question
in the petition and the determination
therein is res judicata. The fact that the petition also sought
to have the entire estate declared to be community property
did not oust the court sitting in probate of jurisdiction to
determine the question of heirship. Anything in the Estate
Kurt, 83 Cal..1:\pp.2d 681 [189 P.2d 528], inconsistent with
the conclusion herein is disapproved. Because of what has
been said a retrial of the cause becomes unnecessary.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed
to enter judgment awarding the plaintiff one-half of the
property of the decedent and such other relief as may flow
from his ownership and right to possession thereof.
.)

Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.

B

McCOMB, J.-I concur in the judgment on the sole ground
that the question presented is res judicata.
Schauer, J., concurred.
The petition of respondent Security-First National Bank
for a rehearing was denied July 24, 1956. Spence, J., did not
participate therein. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.
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